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Liberal Democracy and the Right to Religious 
Freedom 
Aldir Guedes Soriano* 
ABSTRACT 
Foremost, this paper examines the current situation of the rights to religious 
freedom and democracy around the world, which deserve attention and concern. 
Civil liberties are currently in crossfire. This article examines the foundations 
of the right to religious freedom. Depending on the philosophical foundations, 
there are two different rationales for the right to religious freedom: liberal and 
anti-liberal. According to the liberal tradition, the best reason to protect 
religious freedom rests upon the autonomy of the individual conscience. It is 
clear that a constitutional democracy does not allow the establishment of any 
religion by the government, using either executive or legislative power. In other 
words, there are democratic restrictions to the autonomy of the collective 
consensus in the sphere of religious conscience. Behind the discussions of the 
separation between church and state and of different forms of government, there 
is a struggle between the autonomy of individual conscience and the autonomy 
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of the collective consensus. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the 
importance of liberal thought as the foundation of democracy, religious freedom, 
and all of Western civilization. The paper also shows the risk to both 
democracy and religious freedom if a government was to adopt the anti-liberal 
viewpoint of religious freedom, or in other words, the full autonomy of the 
collective consensus. Individuals should be free to choose how they want to live 
and what to believe in.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental right to religious freedom may be considered a 
legacy of the liberal thought that permeated the American 
Revolution and was a determining factor in the coming forth of the 
U.S. Constitution. This same chain of political thought also 
influenced the constitutionalism of other nations, mainly Western 
ones. Thus, religious freedom, as an established human right by-law, 
is a recent achievement in the history of mankind, which may easily 
be associated with the coming forth of the liberal and democratic 
state. Without democracy, there are neither civil rights nor religious 
freedom. Democracy is the substrate that permits the exercise of 
religious freedom and the other fundamental rights of the human 
person. 
Lamentably, democracy is in decline around the world and all 
civil liberties are under crossfire.1 The freedoms of expression and 
religion, the touchstones of democracy, are also being threatened. It 
must be understood that religious freedom and democracy are 
inseparable. 
In the context of these threats against democracy and individual 
liberty, it is essential to restore the liberal thought of such authors as 
John Locke, the father of liberalism, and John Rawls, who was 
responsible for the resurgence of political liberalism. 
 
 
 1. See LARRY DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE 
SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 56–87 (2008) (discussing generally the global “democratic 
recession” that commenced in 1999 and continuing today, and highlighting a number of swing 
states that impact this trend such as China, India, and Russia); see also BRIAN J. GRIMM & ROGER 
FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 83–84 (2011) (presenting the increasing trend from 2001 to 2007 of social and 
governmental restriction on religion and arguing that in many of these countries, religion is 
viewed as a political threat). 
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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of 
liberal thought as the foundation of democracy, religious freedom, 
and all of Western civilization. 
II. CURRENT SITUATION SURROUNDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
DEMOCRACY 
Today, religious freedom is a fundamental right of the human 
person, consecrated in the constitutions of a number of democratic 
states and in the principal international human rights treaties.2 
Thus, it is not just a natural right with no binding legal force. It is an 
achievement without which there could be neither social peace nor 
harmonious association among the various existing religious 
expressions in society, including atheists and agnostics.3 
In spite of the recognition of religion-related rights in the most 
important international human rights treaties and in the 
constitutions of the various democratic and even non-democratic 
states, the overall status of these rights is worrisome at the least. 
Paul Marshall observed that religious persecutions affect all religious 
groups, such as the Baha’i in Iran, Ahmadis in Pakistan, Buddhists in 
China-Tibet, members of the Falun Gong religion in China, and 
Christians in Saudi Arabia.4 In addition to these religious groups, 
atheists and agnostics may also suffer persecution. For instance, it is 
illegal to be an atheist in Indonesia.5 In Saudi Arabia, a person who 
declares himself to be an atheist may be executed for apostasy.6 
However, Christians are the ones who most often suffer 
persecution.7 In 1997, Marshall estimated that at least two-hundred 
 
 2. Aldir Guedes Soriano, Direito à Liberdade Religiosa sob a Perspectiva da Democracia 
Liberal [Right to Religious Freedom Under the Perceptive of the Liberal Democracy], in DIREITO À 
LIBERDADE RELIGIOSA: DESAFIOS E PERSPECTIVAS PARA O SÉCULO XXI [RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: 
CHALLENGERS AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE 21ST CENTURY] 165 (2009). For examples of constitutions 
with human rights provisions, please see infra note 44 and accompanying text. For examples of 
human rights treatises, please see infra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
 3. Basically, atheists do not believe in God, while agnostics doubt his existence but 
admit a chance of the possibility of his existence. 
 4. See Paul Marshall, The Current State of Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE 
WORLD 18, 18–25 (2000). 
 5. See Paul Marshall, Country Profiles: Indonesia, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 161, 
164 (2000). 
 6. See Paul Marshall, Country Profiles: Saudi Arabia, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 
265, 266 (2000) (explaining that anyone who converts from Islam faces the death penalty for 
apostasy). 
 7. See DAVID B. BARRETT & TODD M. JOHNSON, WORLD CHRISTIAN TRENDS, AD 30–AD 
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million Christians lived under some form of religious oppression, 
discrimination, or persecution in more than sixty countries.8 Even 
today, many Christians are discriminated against, persecuted, 
incarcerated, executed, beheaded, hanged, martyred, or tortured to 
death because of their faith.9 
According to research reports, the most egregious persecutions 
and violations of the right to religious freedom are spread over the 
Eastern and Near East countries (North Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula of Asia).10 Indeed, there are terrible religious persecutions 
in many countries located in the “10/40 Window.”11 The situation is 
markedly better in democratic countries of the Western world.12 As 
Marshall observed, of the twenty nations considered “not free,” 
twelve are Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Iraq, Maldives, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Mauritania, Pakistan, and Palestine).13 Of these twenty countries, it 
 
2200: INTERPRETING THE ANNUAL CHRISTIAN MEGACENSUS 399 (Christopher Guidry & Peter 
Crossing eds., 2001) (presenting lists detailing the number of martyrs to which the Christian 
religions have been subjected over the past century); GRIMM & FINKE, supra note 2, at 11 (noting 
that 130,000–170,000 people die each year from violence directed at Christianity alone). 
 8. See PAUL MARSHALL & LELA GILBERT, THEIR BLOOD CRIES OUT 225 (1997). 
 9. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., RISING TIDE OF 
RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 22–24 (2012), available at http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Topics/Issues/Government/RisingTideofRestrictions-fullreport.pdf (showing that in 2010 
Christians were being harassed in 111 different countries, more than any other religion). 
Harassment was defined as physical assaults, arrests and detentions, the discretion of holy sites, 
discrimination against religious groups in employment or education or housing. Id. 
 10. See ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2013: DEMOCRATIC 
BREAKTHROUGHS IN THE BALANCE 4–5, 7–8 (2013), available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-
%20for%20Web_0.pdf (acknowledging relative success of developing democratic ideals in these 
regions of the world, but identifying a number of countries that are still “Not Free” or “Partly 
Free” only). 
 11. The “10/40 Window” refers to the parts of the Eastern Hemisphere, as well as the 
European and African part of the Western Hemisphere, that are located between ten and forty 
degrees north of the equator. See Elizabeth McAlister, Globalization and the Religious Production of 
Space, 44 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 249, 252 (2005) (explaining this point). For an 
empirical presentation of current trends towards religious freedom in this area of the world, see 
THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 9. 
 12. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 9, at 
28–29 (showing that Western countries experience less social hostility towards religion than 
their Eastern counterparts). 
 13. Paul Marshall, The Current State of Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE 
WORLD 18, 18–28 (2000). See also THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., supra note 9, at 11 (listing Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
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may also be inferred that five of them have anti-democratic 
tendencies (China, North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and China-Tibet) 
and have systematically restricted the freedom of religion and the 
freedom of speech.14 Thus, democratic and Christian states of the 
Western world offer better conditions for the exercise of religion-
related public liberties. On the other hand, non-democratic states are 
notorious for serious freedom of belief violations and persecutions. 
According to Robert F. Drinan, the “172 nations that 
participated in the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna repeated and reinforced the proclamations of world law in 
favor of religious freedom,”15 such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 1966.16 This same conference 
established the proposition of the universality of human rights over 
cultural relativism.17 Also, according to the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration, “all human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated.”18 Therefore, religious freedom is, 
theoretically, a transnational right that should be equally respected, 
regardless of national culture. 
The controversy regarding the universality of human rights 
proclaimed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
also present in the debates surrounding Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 196619 and in 
the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
 
Palestinian territories as countries that experience some of the most religiously hostile activity). 
 14. See id. at 19–20 (noting that China, Tibet, North Korea, and Vietnam are dominated 
by communist powers and also score low in religious freedom tests). 
 15. ROBERT F. DRINAN, CAN GOD AND CAESAR COEXIST?: BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2004). 
 16. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (providing that everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and the right to manifest that belief in worship, 
observance, practice, and teaching). 
 17. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration on Human 
Rights 1993, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Jun. 25, 1993) (stating that all people have the 
right of self-determination and because of this right, individuals may pursue their own 
economic, social, and cultural development). 
 18. Id. ¶ 5. 
 19. See MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 194–
226 (James Crawford et al. eds., 1997) (explaining that the controversy generally included the 
appropriate scope of the right of religious freedom). A major provision of contention in regards 
to Article 18 was whether to include the right to change one’s religion. Id. at 201–02, 221. 
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of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of 1981.20 Even today, 
in spite of the consensus achieved at the 1993 Vienna Conference, 
the idea of cultural relativism continues to be invoked as a 
justification for discrimination and even for the persecution of 
religious minorities through government institutions.21 Thus, 
cultural relativism in relation to the universality of human rights 
continues as a challenge to international law in the Twenty-First 
Century. 
Yet, Cançado Trindade argues that “the two world human rights 
conferences, the 1968 Tehran Conference and the 1993 Vienna 
Conference [World Conference on Human Rights], are, in fact, part 
of a lengthy process of constructing a universal culture of observing 
human rights.”22 However, this process is slow, and possibly 
ineffectual in certain contexts. Littman, for example, argues that the 
1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam clearly establishes 
that human rights should submit to Islamic law, i.e. Shari’a, rather 
than Islamic law accommodating universally accepted human 
rights.23 
Incidentally, it should be noted that democracy around the world 
has been in considerable decline and there is a notorious decrease of 
public freedoms in thirty-eight countries.24 Despite the political 
revolutions in the Middle East and Northern Africa over the past 
couple of years, the 2013 Freedom House report warns that gains for 
 
 20. See id. at 231 (stating that Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration was closely modeled after 
Article 18 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
 21. See David G. Littman, Universal Rights and “Human Rights in Islam,” in THE MYTH OF 
ISLAMIC TOLERANCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW TREATS NON-MUSLIMS 317, 321–22 (Robert Spencer ed., 
2005) (saying that a criticism of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights comes from 
countries like China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia which have ancient legal systems, 
calling “for human rights to be viewed in the historical and cultural context of each country or 
civilization”). 
 22. ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL EM UM MUNDO EM 
TRANSFORMAÇÃO [INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TRANSFORMING WORLD] 649 (2002). 
 23. Littman, supra note 21, at 327–28 (demonstrating that the Cairo Declaration subjects 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to Islamic Law). Cf. BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS & 
CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM 51–67 (1985) (explaining that historically, and under Koran authority, 
non-Muslims in Islamic territory were subjected to discriminatory taxes, exclusion from public 
office, inequality in the eyes of the law, restrictions on religious freedom, and general 
segregation and humiliation). 
 24. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 46–87 (arguing that from 1974 through 2006, twelve 
countries experienced a political breakdown without any return to democracy as of 2007, such as 
Sudan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Venezuela). 
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freedom in these regions are threatened by opposition from 
“governments, security forces, ruling families, or religiously based 
political factions.”25 Some even find that instead of promoting 
democracy, the Arab Spring movement opened an opportunity for 
radicals to establish theocratic government models.26 
Thus, political scientist Larry Diamond warns that the 
“democratic recession” is more important than the “economic 
recession.”27 Moreover, Daniel Greenfield observed that 
“[a]ccording to the Economist’s Democracy Index, there are twenty-
six full democracies and fifty-five authoritarian regimes with the 
latter outnumbering the former in population three to one.”28 
III. DEMOCRATIC ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 was the first liberal 
document to establish the idea of the universality of natural or 
innate rights.29 The same idea was later reproduced in the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States of 1776,30 in the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 
1789,31 and even in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948.32 Indeed, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
 
 25. PUDDINGTON, supra note 10, at 2. 
 26. See JOHN R. BRADLEY, AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: HOW ISLAMISTS HIJACKED THE MIDDLE 
EAST REVOLTS 14–16 (2012). 
 27. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 46-87. 
 28. DANIEL GREENFIELD, 10 REASONS TO ABOLISH THE UN 53 (2011). Cf. ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE ECONOMIST, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2011: DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS 2 
(2011) (showing that authoritarian regimes outnumber full democracies about 2:1, but that 
authoritarian regimes are composed of 37.6% percent of the world population whereas full 
democracies include only 11.3%). 
 29. See FORREST CHURCH, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: WRITINGS ON A 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM BY AMERICA’S FOUNDERS 26–28 (2004) (explaining that the Virginia 
state delegates drafted a declaration of rights that stood as a model for the twelve other 
colonies); see also PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 195 (Harper Perennial 
1999) (1997) (stating that the Virginia Declaration of Rights provided a model for James 
Madison when he drafted the federal Bill of Rights). 
 30. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (claiming that “all men are 
created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” including “Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”). 
 31. THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN arts. 1, 4 (Fr. 
1789) (arguing that men are born and remain free and equal in rights and that the natural rights 
of man has no bounds other than to ensure that others enjoy the same right). 
 32. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at 71 art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating that “[a]ll beings are born free and equal in 
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Rights of 1948 proclaims: “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”33 
 Further, according to Michael McConnell, the provision of 
religious freedom in the Virginia Declaration of 1776 is recognized 
as the precursor to the First Amendment of the American 
Constitution.34 It is interesting to note the concept of religion as a 
duty of obedience to divine precepts in the Virginia Declaration: 
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are 
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the 
dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to 
practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each 
other.35 
The United States’ Declaration of Independence reflects political 
liberalism, as well as the Judeo-Christian legacy. This most 
important document presents the idea that “men are created equal” 
and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.”36 
Thus, the rights are not concessions from the king, the government, 
or the state. On the contrary, this document establishes that “to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men.”37 
Therefore, the foremost purpose of the democratic and liberal state 
is to protect the human person and her unalienable rights. In the 
words of Jacques Maritain, the state is  
“an instrument in the service of man.”38 In contrast, it would be a 
political perversion to place man at the service of this instrument, 
 
dignity and rights”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 155 
(1992). 
 35. Virginia Declaration of Rights, ¶ XVI (1776), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp; see also CHURCH, supra note 31, at 26–30 
(telling some of the background story behind the drafting of paragraph sixteen of the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights). 
 36. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 37. Id. 
 38. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 13 (Catholic Univ. of Am. Press 1998) 
(1951). 
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the state.39 Ultimately, the state can neither revoke nor restrict 
human rights at its own pleasure because it was not the author of 
those rights. Rights are innate, whether from the rational point of 
view (natural rights) or a metaphysical or religious point of view. 
The First Amendment of the American Constitution contains 
two interrelated pillars or crucial principles of liberal democracy: the 
free exercise of religion (Free-Exercise Clause) and the non-
establishment of religion by the state (non-Establishment Clause).40 
The metaphor of the wall of separation was canonized by two 
important U.S. Supreme Court decisions written by Justice Hugo L. 
Black in Everson v. Board of Education41 and McCollum v. Board of 
Education.42 From these cases prevailed the understanding that 
neither the states nor the federal government may establish a 
church. According to Justice Black, the wall should be “kept high and 
impenetrable.”43 
Today, constitutions around the world typically contain a 
catalogue of fundamental rights (the dogmatic part) that guarantees 
to citizens the greatest possible freedom with minimum necessary 
restrictions that are still in consonance with liberal democracy.44 
IV. LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT TO 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The legal and philosophical foundation of the right to religious 
freedom may be found by responding to the following question: Why 
should the state protect the right to religious freedom? Two major 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND 
FAIRNESS 1 (2006) (identifying free practice of religion and the prohibition of a governmentally 
established religion as crucial principles of liberal democracy). 
 41. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (stating that the First Amendment was intended to erect a wall 
of separation between Church and the State and thus, neither state nor federal governments can 
set up churches, pass laws aiding religion, influence men to choose a particular religion, or 
participate in the affairs of any religious groups). 
 42. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (arguing “that both 
the religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the 
other within its respective sphere” and thus the First Amendment has erected a wall between 
Church and State). 
 43. Id.; see also DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 4–5 (2002) (explaining how Justice Black’s gloss on Thomas 
Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor dominates modern political and legal discourse on this subject). 
 44. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., ch.2, 1996; Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59, 
(1991); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.). 
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theoretical frameworks each attempt to answer this question and 
establish the foundation of the right to religious freedom. They are 
the liberal viewpoint and the anti-liberal viewpoint. 
A. The Liberal View of Religious Freedom 
Liberal, in this article, refers to less government generally. 
According to the American founding fathers, government power 
should be subject to checks and balances to best ensure the 
protection of individual freedoms. Less government can therefore 
offer better protection than more government. Liberal, in this 
article, is also associated to political liberalism, which teaches that 
governments should be neutral between competing conceptions of 
good.45 
The liberal viewpoint believes that the state should protect 
religious freedom because the citizen has the right to choose.46 That 
is, he has the right to choose his beliefs and to live according to the 
dictates of his religious, atheist, or agnostic conscience—or not. This 
answer to the original question, however, poses another question: 
Why should the citizen’s right to choose be respected? The most 
satisfactory explanation is connected to the dignity of the human 
person. Accordingly, the state should respect choices because human 
beings are endowed with their own intrinsic dignity and, therefore, 
deserve to be treated with respect and consideration. Thus, the 
cardinal foundation of the right to religious freedom is the dignity of 
the human person.47 
Political liberalism and democracy also benefit the state by 
bolstering individuals and economies. The prosperity of the United 
States of America was built under liberal principles. Democracy led 
this nation to the pinnacle of the world. According to Alexis de 
Tocqueville, religion in America established by itself its own 
limits.48 In sum, the liberal viewpoint of religious freedom is 
 
 45. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 46. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 42–43 (1996) (identifying that some 
believe freedom of religion is important because it is a way a person exercises autonomy in 
shaping his life). 
 47. On the dignity of the human person, see generally PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ON THE 
DIGNITY OF MAN (Charles Glenn Willis trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1965) (1940). 
 48. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, A DEMOCRACIA NA AMÉRICA, LIVRO II [DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA, VOLUME II] 6 (Eduardo Brandão trans., Martins Fontes 2004). On the United States of 
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beneficial to the individual, to the economy and to the state. 
The liberal viewpoint further sees the foundation of religious 
freedom as residing in the autonomy of the individual conscience, 
that is, in the right to choose.49 
To John Garvey, the liberal viewpoint would be agnostic and 
would therefore include a broad concept of religion, to the point of 
accepting “that even disbelief is a kind of religion.”50 It is 
noteworthy that this viewpoint, called agnostic by Garvey, broadens 
religious freedom to reach both believers and non-believers (atheists 
and agnostics). In other words, it protects both religion and 
irreligion. The liberal concept, however, does not represent a break 
with religion, although it might adopt the rational viewpoint of 
natural right. Instead, liberal thought bases the right to religious 
freedom on the right to choose (autonomy of the individual 
conscience), which the Bible calls free will. The liberal thought of 
John Locke, John Milton, and even of the French Illuminist Voltaire 
did not completely break with either metaphysics or religion.51 
Therefore, the liberal viewpoint could not be classified as agnostic 
because it is based in part on a biblical idea. 
According to the liberal tradition, the right to choose is one of 
the most fundamental rights of the human person.52 The dignity of 
the person is denigrated when the citizen is hindered in the exercise 
of his right to choose and express his religious beliefs through 
worship, teaching, and observing a religious day of rest compatible 
with his religion. 
 
America as a pinnacle nation, see generally BEN CARSON, AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL: 
REDISCOVERING WHAT MADE THIS NATION GREAT 179–95 (2013). 
 49. See GARVEY, supra note 46, at 42–43 (noting the role of autonomy in religious 
freedom). 
 50. Id. at 43 (arguing that the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution appears to be 
inconsistent with the idea of autonomy because it seems to favor “choices for religion over 
choices against religion”). 
 51. Such authors did not break with religion. On the contrary, they created a synthesis 
between religion, reason, and natural right. To Umberto Eco, Illuminism was a heterogeneous 
movement divided into: 1) the Christian Illuminism of Voltaire, Kant, Newton, and Rousseau, 
and 2) the Atheistic Illuminism of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. UMBERTO ECO, EM QUE CRÊEM OS 
QUE NÃO CRÊEM? [WHAT DO NON-BELIEVERS BELIEVE IN?] 129–34 (10th ed. 2006). 
 52. John Milton, Areopagitica, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD NO.32, at 394–95 
(Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (1644) (discussing 
the freedom to choose that God gave to Adam and what Adam did with that freedom). 
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B. The Anti-Liberal View of Religious Freedom 
Anti-liberal, here, means more government and, perhaps, the 
imposition of predefined thought and behavior standards by the 
state. More government often means less individual liberty. John 
Garvey presents an anti-liberal concept of religious freedom based on 
the idea that religion is a good thing.53 According to Garvey’s anti-
liberal viewpoint, the state should protect religious freedom because 
religion is a “good thing.”54 But, state protection of religious 
freedom simply because it is a good thing presents at least two 
important difficulties. First, the state would have to define which 
beliefs constitute religion, which is an insurmountable impossibility 
if the state is democratic, secular, and pluralistic. A secular state 
cannot define what amounts to “religion”; only a theocratic state 
would be able to do this. This kind of definition is possible when 
there is a fusion between civil law and religion. There is nothing 
more utopian than the pretense of achieving a legal religious concept 
that satisfies the entire diversity of creeds that exist in human 
societies. 
Furthermore, the anti-liberal premise—religion is merely a good 
thing—is an axiom. Would it be reasonable to admit that if religion 
is a good thing for the individuals that it would also be a good thing 
for the state? Further, which religious concept should a state adopt? 
Would it be the sum of all religions, or a synthesis of them? If the 
citizen did not agree with the result, would he not be excluded from 
the state and society? Characterizing and supporting religious 
freedom simply because it is a good thing does not provide an 
answer to these critical questions. And, if a citizen ultimately 
disagrees with the state’s position, it is likely that he would be 
excluded from the society. Such a result is the harsh opposite of 
religious freedom. 
As is apparent, the anti-liberal idea of religious freedom, in 
contrast with political liberalism, would permit only a single moral 
concept of good, established a priori. Therefore, an anti-liberal  
 
 
 53. GARVEY, supra note 46, at 49–57 (arguing that religious freedom should not be 
protected in order to preserve autonomy, but that religious freedom should be preserved because 
religion in inherently good). 
 54. Id. 
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concept of religious freedom would end up restricting the citizen’s 
right to choose. 
In defining religion, the state would end up adopting an official 
religion. The human person would not be completely free to choose 
because he would be conditioned to pre-established standards and 
conform to the one moral concept of good. Such thought revives the 
medieval view of religious freedom, which restricts human liberty far 
beyond what is reasonable because it authorizes freedom within the 
boundaries of the dominant state religion and impedes the right to 
choose. In fact, the anti-liberal view of religious freedom is a return 
to the confessional state or to the religious view of religious freedom 
(libertas ecclesiae).55 Therefore, the anti-liberal tendency is contrary to 
pluralism, religious diversity, and religious freedom for all religions 
and religious groups under equal terms. 
V. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE THOUGHT OF JOHN RAWLS 
As explained, liberal democracy is the political system that offers 
the best conditions for peaceful association among all religions and 
religious professions.56 In this regard, Ortega y Gasset observed: 
The political form that provides the greatest desire for association 
is liberal democracy. It takes to the extreme the decision to take 
one’s neighbor into consideration and is the prototype of ‘indirect 
action.’ Liberalism is the principle of public right by which public 
power, even if it is omnipotent, is limited to itself and seeks, even 
at the possible expense of its existence, to leave a place in the state 
in which it rules for those to live who neither think nor feel like it 
does, that is, in the same way that the strongest and the majority 
do. Liberalism, it should be remembered, is the supreme 
generosity: it is the right that the majority grants to the minority. 
Therefore, it is the noblest of cries that ever sounded on the 
planet.57 
The idea of justice as fairness, as elaborated by John Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, applies in the context of the 
fundamental right to religious freedom because this theory 
 
 55. JÓNATAS MACHADO, A LIBERDADE RELIGIOSA NUMA COMUNIDADE CONSTITUCIONAL 
INCLUSIVE [Religious Freedom in an Inclusive Constitutional Community] 50–52 (1996). 
 56. See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. 
 57. JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET, A REBELIÃO DAS MASSAS [The Rebellion of the Masses] 108 
(Marvlene P. Michael trans., 3d ed. 2007). 
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reconciles two important values: the liberties of the moderns, 
associated with John Locke; and the liberties of the ancients, which 
is individual freedom and equality, as represented by Rousseau.58 
Furthermore, the Harvard philosopher’s liberal propositions 
contribute to the resolution of difficult cases in which rights collide. 
In other words, Rawls’s liberalism establishes a clear limit on the 
restriction of individual freedoms. 
In his theory, Rawls starts with the presupposed fact of 
pluralism, which divides society with its profound and 
insurmountable religious, philosophical, political, and moral 
differences.59 From this finding comes the question or central 
problem of his reflections: how can society be ordered so that free 
and equal individuals may peacefully associate in spite of their 
profound religious, cultural, and moral differences?60 
According to Rawls’s thought, constitutional democracy 
acknowledges all reasonable religious views (diverse reasonable 
views of good on reasonable terms).61 This is the central idea of his 
first principle: “Each person has equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is 
compatible with the same for all; and in this scheme the equal 
political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their 
fair value.”62 For example, constitutional democracy does not 
acknowledge anti-social behavior that is incompatible with peaceful 
association, such as a religion that practices human sacrifice. This, 
then, is the restriction on individual liberties. The state should 
permit all religious practices, except those that involve acts that are  
 
 
 58. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4–11 (expanded ed. 2005) (distinguishing 
what is called the “liberties of the moderns,” which includes freedom of thought and conscience, 
from “the liberties of the ancients,” which focused on equal political liberties and the values of 
public life); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–15 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the concept of 
“justice as fairness”). 
 59. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 58, at 3–4 (stating that the political 
culture of a democratic society is marked by opposing and irreconcilable “religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines”). 
 60. Id.at 4 (asking how it is possible for a just and stable society of free and equal citizens 
to exist over time despite these doctrinal divisions). 
 61. Id. at 18–22 (discussing the concept of “good” and its relation to religion, and how 
each person’s conception of “good” may be different but that cooperation allows these varying 
understandings). 
 62. Id. at 5. 
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anti-social and hostile to the human being himself. It is prohibited to 
kill, rob, or commit fraud in the name of religion.63 
Further, the restriction of the freedom of conscience on account 
of security and public order is the logical consequence of 
contractualism. This does not, however, imply that public interests 
are on a higher plane in relation to religious or moral interests. 
Indeed, the government is not authorized to suppress convictions 
because they conflict with state affairs.64 It may restrict the right of 
religion only in the case of incompatibility with public order and 
peaceful association. 
Religious pluralism is wholesome. It presents no threat to 
individual freedoms or to the democratic state. In a democratic and 
pluralistic state, all religions can coexist in peace. Furthermore, 
social harmony does not depend on the elimination of differences 
nor on the union, unification, or homogenization of the religious 
diversity in the society.65 On the other hand, religious ecumenism, if 
promoted by the state in pursuit of its own uniform morality, may 
represent a threat to religious freedom. Nothing prevents individuals 
and religious organizations from promoting the pursuit of religious 
unity. The right to religious freedom, in theory, also protects 
ecumenical ideas, but an ecumenical unity should not be imposed on 
everyone, especially not through the coercive force of government 
legislation. Similarly, constitutional law protects religion and 
atheism through the right to believe, but neither should be imposed 
on citizens. In his commentary in the book AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS by Eric Voegelin, Ellis Sandoz says that “the idea of 
ecumenism is one more way for man to achieve libido dominandi over 
his fellow man without worrying about the moral consequences of 
his actions.”66 
 
 63. See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) 
(holding a law that disallowed the use of Sacramental Peyote was constitutional because it was 
facially neutral and generally applicable). Laws prohibiting what a legislature deems anti-social 
behavior are generally upheld despite the negative impact they may have on a particular religion. 
Id. 
 64. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 59, at 219–20 (arguing that the 
paternalistic nature of the state should not be interpreted as a license to constrain convictions). 
 65. Regarding the absence of attempting religious unification and seeking a world 
religion, see generally LEE PENN, FALSE DAWN: THE UNITED RELIGIONS INITIATIVE, GLOBALISM, AND 
THE QUEST FOR A ONE-WORLD RELIGION (2004). 
 66. Ellis Sandoz, Commentary to ERIC VOEGELIN, REFLEXÕES AUTOBIOGRÁFICAS 
[Autobiographical Reflections] 157 n.2 (2007). 
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Upon acknowledging the fact that pluralism is an 
insurmountable element of a contemporary and democratic society, 
tolerance should be promoted in the sense of respecting religious 
freedom, regardless of existing theological divergences. It would be a 
mistake to encourage tolerance based only on what the various 
religious confessions have in common. An intolerant person is one 
who does not acknowledge the religious freedom of others. It is the 
duty of all citizens to promote peace and tolerance. Religious 
freedom and tolerance contribute to the reduction of social conflict. 
And although it is not always possible to find common ground in 
religious matters, atheists, agnostics, and religious people do not 
have to agree about their convictions in order to respect each other, 
nor to work together for everyone’s freedom of conscience. 
VI. AUTONOMY OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE OR AUTONOMY OF 
THE COLLECTIVE CONSENSUS? 
To Karl Loewenstein, the most effective restriction among all 
restrictions imposed on the state is the legal recognition of certain 
spheres of self-determination that the state may not penetrate.67 
Therefore, there is a sphere in which the individual has complete and 
absolute autonomy. Not even the law may invade this sphere.68 
Encircling this sphere of action, there exists another area in which 
the citizen’s freedom does submit to the law. This is known as 
heteronomy. In this sphere, there is autonomy of the collective 










 67. Karl Loewenstein, Teoría de la Constitución [The Theory of the Constitution] 390 (1965). 
 68. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (stating that “[t]he freedom to 
hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute”). 
 69. See HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT’S THEORY OF FREEDOM 99 (1990) (explaining the 
dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy). 
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Please consider the discussion below to better understand the 
interplay between autonomy and heteronomy. 
Autonomy. Autonomy is the freedom that an individual has to 
self-determination. According to liberal thought, as already 
established, the individual has the right to choose: to do or not to 
do; to act or not to act; to have or not to have a religious belief.70 
Accordingly, the freedoms of conscience, belief, and worship are 
made inviolable. For instance, Article 5, paragraph 6, of the Brazilian 
Federal Constitution of 1988 states: 
All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction 
whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country being 
ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to equality, to 
security and to property, on the following terms: 
6. freedom of conscience and of belief is inviolable, the free exercise 
of religious cults being ensured and, under the terms of the law, the 
protection of places of worship and their rites being guaranteed.71 
Heteronomy. To a certain extent, the idea of heteronomy is 
connected to the notion of the democratic state of law, which 
subjugates all citizens through law enacted by the people.72 
Accordingly, verticality is in force: everyone is obligated to obey the 
 
 70. See supra Part V. 
 71. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [FEDERAL CONSTITUTION] art. 5, para. 6 (Braz.). 
 72. See ALLISON, supra note 69, at 99. 
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laws promulgated by the legislative power. In addition to 
safeguarding the Constitution, constitutional restrictions also 
protect the citizen, since no infra-constitutional law may annul or 
restrict fundamental human rights. A law duly enacted by the 
legislative process may not empty the vital contents of fundamental 
rights. For example, when this happens in the Brazilian system, such 
laws may lose their force by being declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court. 
According to Baron Montesquieu, “[l]iberty is the right to do 
everything the laws permit.”73 Similarly, Article 5, section 2, of the 
Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 proclaims that “no one shall 
be obliged to do or refrain from doing something, except by virtue of 
the law.”74 Only the law may restrict human liberty and it is worth 
remembering that the law may restrict only those actions that are 
harmful to society.75 The promulgated laws may not be used as 
instruments of oppression or discrimination, which is why they are 
subject to abstract constitutional control. 
John Garvey believes that “the best reason for protecting 
religious freedom rests upon the assumptions that religion is a good 
thing.”76 I disagree with this anti-liberal point of view. In my 
opinion, the best reasons for protecting religious freedom rests upon 
the autonomy of the individual conscience or, in other words, on the 
individual right of choice. 
According to the liberal point of view, a citizen has the right to 
choose to believe or not to believe. Conversely, according to the anti-
liberal viewpoint, the citizen is obliged to follow an official belief 
adopted by the state. In this case, he does not have the right to 
believe or to disbelieve, according to his own conscience. Thus, the 
liberal viewpoint provides more liberty to believers and non-believers 
alike. 
The liberal viewpoint is not an agnostic conception of religious 
freedom.77 On the other hand, the anti-liberal point of view does not 
 
 73. CHARLES DE SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, On the Laws that form Political Liberty in its 
Relation with the Constitution, in THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 154, 155 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 
trans., 1989). 
 74. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [FEDERAL CONSTITUTION] art. 5, para. 2 (Braz.). 
 75. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 76. .See supra note 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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provide for the autonomy of the individual conscience or the 
individual right of choice. If a state adopts the anti-liberal viewpoint 
of religious freedom, the government is allowed to interfere inside of 
the sphere that belongs to autonomy of individual conscience. 
According to this conception, the autonomy of the collective 
consensus or the autonomy of the collective conscience is 
superordinate to the individual right of choice. 
Here, it is reasonable to establish a connection between the anti-
liberal viewpoint and either totalitarian ideologies or theocratic 
systems, in which the right to choose is not allowed. A theocratic 
government is also anti-liberal because it denies the autonomy of 
individual choice. Under this condition, changing one’s religious 
persuasion is not allowed, even punishable by death in extreme 
cases. Totalitarian regimes are also anti-liberal because the right to 
believe is not allowed. Both totalitarian and theocratic states adopt 
the autonomy of collective consensus and don’t allow for individual 
choice. Human liberty is restricted and violated within the sphere of 
individual autonomy. Thus, there are greater restrictions on an 
individual’s right to choose under the anti-liberal point of view. 
One could ask if in the democratic system the majority 
preference (or collective consensus) should always prevail. No, it 
cannot and should not. Both autonomy of individual conscience and 
autonomy of the collective consensus must coexist. Such a scenario 
would create a dictatorship of the majority, which must be avoided, 
especially in the sphere of religious conscience. Both the American 
and Brazilian Constitutions establish limitations to the autonomy of 
the collective consensus on religious matters.78 
The First Amendment to the American Constitution states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”79 
As a liberal document, the American Constitution does not allow 
the establishment of any religion by the government, state or 
legislative power.80 In other words, the First Amendment establishes 
 
 78. See supra notes 40–43, 71 and accompanying text. 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 80. While the Establishment Clause expressly prohibits the establishment of a state 
religion, there is constant debate regarding whether a particular government action reaches the 
level of “establishment.” See, e.g., Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive 
Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 77, 80–81 (2007) (discussing 
various theories that the U.S. Supreme Court applies when determining whether the 
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the autonomy of the individual conscience and, at the same time, 
forbids the autonomy of the collective consensus in the sphere of 
religious conscience. However, there is little doubt that the law can 
restrict religious liberty exercised in cases of threats against the 
public order.81 No one may commit, for instance, murder or 
pedophilia in the name of religious freedom, because such absolute 
rights do not exist and doing so would threaten public order.82 
Similarly, marriage under the legal age is prohibited by law in 
Western countries. 
A complete autonomy of collective consensus on religious 
matters is impracticable if the state is democratic, secular and liberal 
because the state cannot define what religion is and the individual 
has religious freedom. Conversely, it is absolutely possible under 
totalitarian government force because, in that case, the state adopts 
an official position on religious matters in violation of the autonomy 
of the individual conscience. Today, both North Korea and Iran 
maintain different kinds of autonomy of the collective consensus, 
atheistic in the former’s case83 and theocratic in the latter’s.84 
In the last century, the worst genocides were performed by 
totalitarian communist and fascist regimes.85 Joseph Stalin, for 
instance, murdered approximately 43 million people.86 In the name 
of the autonomy of the collective consensus and the elimination of 
the autonomy of the individual conscience, Mao Tse-tung ordered 
 
Establishment Clause has been violated). 
 81. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States., 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (holding that 
Congress could restrict the practice of polygamy despite its use by some religious groups and 
illustrating the point by implying that legislatures would be able to prohibit other socially 
undesirable activities such as human sacrifice even if the practice is proclaimed to be religious). 
 82. Id. (describing the “law of the organization of society” to be under the exclusive 
control of the federal government). 
 83. See The Pew Forum on Religion and Pub. Life, supra note 11, at 33 (explaining that 
North Korea’s government is among the most repressive in the world with respect to religion 
and noting that the U.S. State Department says that religious freedom does not exist in North 
Korea). 
 84. Paul Marshall, Country Profiles: Iran, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 167, 168–69 
(2000) (describing Iran’s theocratic political state). 
 85. See R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 8 (1994) (showing that the majority of this 
century’s mass murders were committed by communist or fascist regimes). 
 86. Id. (stating that Stalin ordered the death of millions and was responsible for millions 
of other deaths as well); see also JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY 59–65 
(2005) (describing the relationship between Mao and Stalin, as well as the killings conducted by 
Mao in China). 
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the death of at least 40 million, including peasants and religious 
people.87 
Why did these atrocities occur? It is because religion, particularly 
Christianity, is a threat to totalitarian government. According to 
Marxism, religion “is the opium of the people.”88 Therefore, Stalin 
and Mao Tse-tung tried to eliminate it by killing and spreading fear. 
It is reasonable to admit that these totalitarian regimes also adopted 
some kind of atheistic full autonomy of the collective consensus. 
Thus, they severely restricted the autonomy of the individual 
conscience and religious freedom in those totalitarian states was 
nonexistent. 
Atheism was the collective consensus adopted by dictators from 
Soviet Gulag and China in the last century. Moreover, the totalitarian 
government power was ensured throughout persecution and violence 
against religious people. Unfortunately, the same thing is happening 
today in North Korea.89 
Finally, I would like to stress that the anti-liberal viewpoint of 
religious freedom can be linked with ecumenism. Ecumenism can be 
a type of autonomy of the collective consensus. It is a utopia, but a 
forced political ecumenism can be established that reflects a 
collective consensus of all religions. If a state follows the anti-liberal 
viewpoint of religious freedom, then it will generally adopt either 
one official religion (a theocratic regime) or a synthesis of all 
religions (ecumenism). Even though ecumenical ideas are under 
religious liberty protection, a democratic government should not 
support it because ecumenism violates the autonomy of individual 
conscience and religious freedom. 
There are two kinds of autonomy of the collective consensus: 
theistic (theocratic) or atheistic. In other words, either religious 
ecumenism or atheism, if promoted by the state in pursuit of its own 
uniform morality, represents a threat to individual liberty, as 
 
 87. See RUMMEL, supra note 85, at 8 (attributing nearly forty million murders to Mao Tse-
tung and stating that this may surprise some people since communist killings under his 
leadership are less known in the West); see also CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 86, at 243–51 
(describing the ruthless and deplorable tactics the Mao used to maintain control of the Chinese 
people in the early 1940s including torture, jailing, and killing). 
 88. KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 1 (Maurice Cowling et al. 
eds., Annette Jolin & Joseph O’Malley trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977). 
 89. See SOON OK LEE, EYES OF THE TAILLESS ANIMALS: PRISON MEMOIRS OF A NORTH 
KOREAN WOMAN 1–10 (1999) (describing the atheistic persecution in North Korea). 
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demonstrated above. Therefore, the autonomy of the collective 
consensus as the foundation for religious liberty is a real threat to 
the individual conscience. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There now exists around the world a marked tendency toward 
authoritarianism and a reduction in the number of countries that 
have full democracy.90 This truly presents a threat to religious 
freedom and other public freedoms. The future of religious freedom 
depends on the survival of liberal democracy, which is the substrate 
that permits the greatest possible freedom with the minimum 
amount of restriction necessary for peaceful social association. 
We live in a world in which the future of religious freedom 
remains uncertain. Thus, one must ask: what is going to prevail in 
the future of the world, a model of minimum government or an 
omnipotent one? A world of free initiative or total governmental 
economic control? One of democracy or totalitarianism? Of universal 
human rights or cultural relativism? A world of autonomy of the 
individual conscience or of the autonomy of the collective 
conscience? Or, finally, of freedom or oppression? 
The consequences of the adoption of the autonomy of the 
collective consensus or, in other words, the adoption of the anti-
liberal conception of religious liberty by the government, would be 
terrible and may mean an open door for religious persecutions or 
even mass killings. 
Because of the consequences of the adoption of the anti-liberal 
conception of religious liberty (autonomy of the collective 
consensus), it is a constitutional duty for all free people to promote 
the principles and values of political liberalism and of the autonomy 
of the individual conscience as well. 
The future of religious freedom depends, in large part, on what 
happens to the future of democracy around the world. The Western 
countries need to remain vigilant. It is important that all democratic 
nations preserve the best of what they have—the principles and 
 
 90. See ECONOMISTS INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 28, at 2–3 (explaining that there has 
been a “decline in democracy across the world in recent years” and that over the past five years 
there has been a backslide on previously attained democratization); see also DIAMOND, supra note 
1, at 59–64 (discussing the breakdowns in democracy since 1999). 
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values of political liberalism, which is also a Judaic-Christian legacy. 
These principles are the true antidotes for tyranny and oppression. If 
Western countries cannot export democracy to “not-free” nations, 
they have at least the challenge to preserve democracy with the goal 
to protect their own populations from totalitarian policy and the 





























 91. Cultural relativism is a troublesome obstacle to the adoption of the universality of the 
human rights by communist and theocratically controlled countries. Those regimes cannot 
assimilate the occidental standard of democracy and human rights. Also troubling is the 
declining level of democracy and individual liberties in the Western countries. Thus, the focus 
should be to improve the inner problem, that is, inside the Western countries. Maybe, the cause 
of such decline rests on the disdain of the principles of liberal democracy and Western values. 
